Does Russell McCutcheon require realism?*

Kevin Schilbrack (2020) claims that for readings of religion to have academic value, they must be able to demonstrate that they are accurate. This, he further claims, requires a realist ontology where the accuracy of arguments depend on their ability to hook up to an objective reality, which, regardless of the time and place the researcher finds themselves, presents itself to us. This being the case, Schilbrack contends that Russell McCutcheon’s non-realist reading of religion is meaningless as if it is true, it could only be so if it pointed to an objective fact about religion; though, if this is the case, then the idea that religion is non-realist falls apart. Schilbrack believes this series of logical inferences produces a reductio ad absurdum of McCutcheon’s position which he cannot escape. However, there are numerous reasons which can be offered which not only provide McCutcheon with an escape but which also demonstrate that, conversely, it is realist arguments which fall into absurdity to the point of being meaningless.

First, the claim that non-realist epistemological arguments are meaningless assumes that they lack causal efficiency – due to their inability to demonstrate their ‘accurateness’, as Schilbrack puts it; however, this assumption does not have to be made. For instance, one can point to several examples were socially constructed arguments, lacking a realist ontological core, can be efficacious. Take, as a random example, the interpretation of art – say the work of Shakespeare. One of Shakespeare’s earliest plays, The Taming of the Shrew, has been interpreted as a play about a strong and independently willed man (Petruchio) and woman (Katherine) who tangle with each other in a battle-like romance. It has also been seen to present a coupling where one partner overpowers the other and, by doing so, displays sadistic and misogynistic traits (Smith, 2019). For these interpretations to have value, though, does one need to assume that there is an essential core – an essentially correct interpretation of this play, as Schilbrack would seem to believe? Feminist writers might want to emphasise the former interpretation, as it demonstrates strong female characters in Shakespeare’s plays; other feminist writers, however, might want to deconstruct the play to argue that it legitimates patriarchal behaviour. The point is that these interpretations are useful in particular situations and receive value from those situations; one does not need to assume an essence to the play which demonstrates, once and for all, that a particular interpretation is the correct one. Of course, Schilbrack might argue that I am talking about a play here and not religion; I am talking, in other words, about an aspect of reality he agrees is socially constructed but not an aspect of reality he argues is realist. However, I would say that the logic from The Taming of the Shrew example is transferrable, and there is nothing in Schilbrack’s essay, which suggests why this logic cannot be transferred. He might suggest that this logic is not transferable because there is an ontic difference between realities which have their internal logic which is mutually incompatible; though, I  question the specific point of whether it is possible to maintain the co-existence of realist and non-realist reality below.

But even on its own terms, Schilbrack’s assumption concerning the need to ground arguments in realist epistemic instruments and reality is problematic.[2] Indeed, there are many reasons to argue that realist arguments, which rely on epistemic instruments, not non-realist ones, are contradictory to the point of being meaningless. For instance, for Schilbrack to state that it is possible to evaluate truth statements concerning religion as either truth in a realist, objective sense, he must already assume the existence of realist epistemic instruments which allow him to perform such a function, and that such realist epistemic instruments are valid. But this latter assumption creates a problem, as then realist epistemic instruments seem to require further epistemic instruments which can demonstrate their meaningfulness as epistemic instruments. This, however, creates an infinite regress and implies, instead, that such instruments are dependent and therefore lacking a realist core.

If Schilbrack wanted to defend his realist arguments from an epistemological point of view, he could say that realist epistemic instruments do not require any further justification – they are realist epistemic instruments because they are realist epistemic instruments. However, this response would be unsatisfactory as it seems to undermine what it meant by epistemic instruments in the first place (why would we need epistemic instruments to know epistemic objects if objects can be understood without the use of epistemic instruments?). Moreover, it would imply that realist epistemic instruments no longer have a universal scope as they would not be able to justify, epistemologically speaking, themselves. This seems to undermine them as realist instruments.

Another problem is that if epistemic instruments are independent of epistemic objects – a point left unclear by Schilbrack due to his lack of engagement with epistemological questions – then what information, what truth, are they meant to express? If they are independent in an essentialist sense, realist epistemic instruments are instruments of nothing. This could reasonably cause one to question how, without looking at objects known, one can confidently argue that realist epistemic instruments, and the arguments they support – such as the argument that religion exists objectively outside of human conceptualisation – are valid. Indeed, one could well argue that the characteristic of self-justification is an example of epistemic practices but not, necessarily, of epistemic instruments – unless, that is, one can provide a reason as to why realist self-justifying epistemic instruments are valid. If someone were to do this, however – perhaps arguing why reason is a valid realist epistemic instrument – one would once again start the infinite regress mentioned above. Moreover, it would mean that epistemic instruments would be dependent and, therefore, non-realist; not self-justifying and realist.

Schilbrack could reply that the epistemic objects, such as religion, existent in a realist way. Thus, Schilbrack could say that truth about certain realities exists outside of social convention and as realist realities know themselves. In other words, Schilbrack could try to establish epistemic instruments off the basis of epistemic objects, not the other way around. This might be Schilbrack’s preferred reply considering his overweighted focus on realist ontology. Though, as should be clear, this move would be question-begging and engages in circular reasoning – how would one know the epistemic object in the first place? Indeed, if Schilbrack did make this assumption, one could ask what the point of epistemic instruments are? If realist epistemic objects, such as religion, were known to us without the need for epistemic instruments, then why is dialogue like the one we are having even taking place?

What this discussion concerning Schilbrack’s first presupposition seems to suggest, then, is that instead of epistemic instruments or objects existing in a realist manner, they, instead, existent in a non-realist manner – as McCutcheon’s argument implies. That is, an epistemic instrument is what it is because of its dependence on epistemic objects; an epistemic object is what it is because of its dependence on epistemic instruments. It seems, in other words, that there is a lack of an epistemological foundation; instead, there is an epistemological anti-foundationalism. Schilbrack, then, cording to the internal logic of his realist commitments, is not right in saying that only by adopting a realist view of the world can we evaluate statements about religion objectively. This is not because McCutcheon’s non-realist reading of religion is ‘accurate’ – indeed, he claims otherwise as Schilbrack notes and criticises him for (3-4). Instead, it is because McCutcheon is right to note that one cannot make realist evaluations concerning religion as every statement which does, rather than non-realist statements, are found to be logically meaningless. That is, they are meaningless as it is only possible, again according to the internal logic of realism itself, for non-realist statements concerning ‘religion’ to have meaning – a meaning not obtained through linking up with the realist reality of Religion, but rather, a meaning obtained due to intersubjective standards and the compositional makeup of the context within which those claims concerning ‘religion’ are made.

For clarification, by arguing for a non-realist reading of epistemology, I am not suggesting there are no epistemic instruments one can rely on; in other words, I am not arguing for an epistemological nihilism. Certain epistemic practices, when in certain situations, can be classified as epistemic instruments due to their conventional ability to apprehend/construct epistemic objects, as I mentioned in the previous paragraph. Though, what I am arguing is that epistemology is dependent – it is dependent on conceptualisation, language, culture, power relations, and societal structures. Most basically, however, as I have said, epistemic instruments and objects are co-dependent.

Though, before I finish, I will pre-empt two further possible retorts. First, Schilbrack may argue that the mutual dependence between epistemic instruments and objects exist in a realist manner; though this position is equally problematic, the reasons why can be worked out by reviewing the problems with establishing epistemic instruments or objects independently. Second, Schilbrack may argue that while it may be true that McCutcheon’s non-realist arguments have value when situated within particular social, cultural, and historical contexts which give them meaning, the logic of McCutcheon’s argument extends beyond these immediate contexts. That is, McCutcheon is not arguing that religion is a socially constructed category with no realist essence in a western context but that it may be different within an Asian context; instead, it seems to be the case that McCutcheon is making universal claims. Schilbrack might, quite rightly, ask how McCutcheon, or any non-realist, could argue for universal non-realism without relying on a realist epistemology. I can say two things: first, McCutcheon would have to acknowledge – indeed, he would be logically forced too – that no epistemic instrument has universal scope – no argument for non-realism can work in all contexts. As non-realism is dependent on the idea of realism, as different realist arguments are made in different contexts, non-realists, in turn, will have to come up with new arguments – this is not a problem, however. As Jan Westerhoff (2011) says: ‘That there is no one argument which works at all times and against all opponents does not mean that the thesis of universal [non-realism] cannot be established at all, but only that different contexts necessitate the use of different sets of conventionally established epistemic instruments’ (94). Second, if the previous point is found lacking, then one can refer to paraconsistent logic – the philosophy of logic position which holds onto the possibility of logical paradoxes – paradoxes which do not result in a logical explosion. This second response is too complicated to engage with adequately here; however, I have written on this topic before concerning the definition of religion debate (https://emptyblogvoices.blogspot.com/2019/10/a-paraconsistent-definition-of-religion_31.html). 

Jack Lewis Graham

*This essay is a supplement to another essay “A Response to Kevin Schilbrack’s ‘A metaphysics for the study of religion: A critical reading of Russell McCutcheon’” published on Empty Voices (https://emptyblogvoices.blogspot.com/2020/02/a-response-to-kevin-schilbracks.html).