A Response to Kevin Schilbrack’s ‘A metaphysics for the study of religion: A critical reading of Russell McCutcheon’

Introduction

In this essay, I respond to Kevin Schilbrack’s (2020) realist critique of Russell McCutcheon’s non-realist theory of religion. Instead of non-realist constructions of religion being metaphysically flawed, I argue that  Schilbrack’s realist reading is both logically inconsistent and question-begging. Following the structure of Schilbrack’s essay, I begin by outlining his primary position and then move on to challenge two realist assumptions which underpin it. First, I challenge Schilbrack’s realist epistemological assumption that a non-realist reading of religion requires a realist epistemology, grounded in a realist ontology, if it is not to fall into meaningless relativism. Second, I raise several questions concerning the critical realist assumption that it is metaphysically and logically possible to maintain the co-existence of constructed and unconstructed realities. After challenging these metaphysical standpoints, I engage with the heart of Schilbrack’s essay – his threefold criticism of McCutcheon’s non-realism. I argue that all of Schilbrack’s arguments are question-begging and do not offer the refutation of McCutcheon’s position he thinks they do. I finish by questioning Schilbrack’s understanding of materialism, asking whether it exists in a robust dichotomous relationship with idealism and whether it enables the realist conclusions he believes it does.

1

Kevin Schilbrack starts his essay by correctly noting that critical theoretical developments within the study of religion have philosophical and metaphysical implications – implications which are often underappreciated and underdeveloped (1-2). Moreover, he, again correctly in my view, notes that as these philosophical and metaphysical implications become more apparent, it is becoming equally clear that a two-fold division is taking place within critical studies. On the one hand, you have scholars, like McCutcheon, who support a non-realist ontology when reading religion. On the other, you have scholars like Schilbrack who support a realist reading. For Schilbrack, the former is defined by a commitment to understanding religion as not only a social construction but a mind-dependent discourse which cannot exist outside of human subjectivity and language/conceptualisation. The latter, conversely, is a view that holds there are social structures which exist objectively – outside of human minds and particular historical contexts. Schilbrack emphasises that religion is a social construction, but that its ontology is realist due to its existence in multiple times and places – times and places which did not even have a concept of religion – and that it refers to an objectively existent phenomenon.

Schilbrack’s realist view on the surface comes across as logically inconsistent – a case of trying to have it both ways. But he holds that such an approach is possible due to his form of realism being an example of ‘critical realism’. Expounding his view further, and establishing a dividing line between himself and scholars like McCutcheon, Schilbrack states:

My realist view is that scholars of religion should avoid both the Scylla that religion corresponds to nothing and the Charybdis that religion (like “helium,” say) corresponds to a natural kind, and they can do so by endorsing a social ontology according to which religion corresponds to a social kind, that is, a historically emergent and culturally variable form of life, a social structure that can be discovered even in times and places where those practising a religion did not have the concept. (2)

As Schilbrack notes, his understanding of critical realism is indebted to Roy Bhaskar. Bhaskar argued that while it is true that knowledge about the world is dependent upon particular contexts, it would be going too far to suggest that such constructivist logic has universal applicability – that is, that every piece of knowledge did not have a realist referent. There is, in other words, a reality which exists outside of human construction – facts about the world which were true before human beings came into existence; which are true while human beings roam and act in this world; and which will continue to be valid after human beings disappear. Thus, again further expounding on his understanding, Schilbrack states that:

A realism like mine permits one to see that human conceptualising does invent some realities, like British traffic laws, NBA championships, marriages, private property, and U.S. dollars. None of these social realities exists independent of collective agreements between people. They are therefore not natural kinds but social or human kinds (Khalidi 2013; Mallon 2015); they require a “historical ontology” that studies culturally emergent ways of being (Hacking 2002, esp. ch. 1). But I also hold that other realities (like carbon, stars, volcanoes, or cell nuclei) existed long before human beings arrived to name them. (3)

Schilbrack argues that his critical realist approach has multiple benefits. For instance, his approach enables scholars to not only maintain the category of religion but reassert its analytical value. As a category, religion, understood in this realist way, does not merely allow scholars to get into the mind of a particular definer and the social world they are situated in – the chief academic value of ‘religion’ for scholars like McCutcheon; instead, the category allows us to study an aspect of the world which has always been present in people’s lives even if they did not know it.

            Also, and most importantly for this essay, Schilbrack argues that a critical realist reading of religion avoids logical problems with a non-realist approach. As he argues, if scholars like McCutcheon adopt the ‘view that there is no reality apart from language, then the scholar would never be able to claim that their scholarship is “accurate”’ (4). Consequently, ‘scholars cannot accuse rival views of “distorting” things or of providing a “flawed” description’ (4). McCutcheon cannot, therefore, claim that his non-realist reading of religion is more accurate than Schilbrack’s, as to do so would require a realist epistemology – how scholars can claim that their statements about religion are true – which would be contradictory. That is, if McCutcheon, and other non-realists, did defend their readings of religion over and against realist readings, they would seem to be using realist epistemic instruments to demonstrate the lack of ontological realism and, by extension, the lack of realist epistemic instruments.

For Schilbrack, then, to understand the value of religion as an analytical category and to avoid logical problems which arise from denying this value, the study of religion must position itself within a realist metaphysics (4).

2

From the above presentation of Schilbrack’s critical realism, we can see that it rests on two philosophical presumptions – one primarily epistemological in character, the other ontological. The former consists of the idea that to make positive arguments about the category of religion, whether from a realist or non-realist perspective, one must engage in realist epistemic instruments – instruments which allow us to access the realist, objective reality of religion and evaluate truth statements concerning it. As mentioned at the end of the last section, Schilbrack argues that it is contradictory to assume that a deconstruction of the category of religion could rest on a non-realist ontology or epistemology as one would not be able to claim that one’s deconstruction is accurate. This critique of non-realism is an important one, as if it is the case that realism, in some form, is needed to make positive arguments, then non-realism is contradictory.

There are numerous issues with Schilbrack epistemological inference, though. Indeed, due to these several issues, and due to the argument’s importance, I wish to engage with it in greater depth than I do other aspects Schilbrack’s argument. But to avoid excessively lengthening and distributing the coherence of this essay, I will include my critique of Schilbrack’s epistemological premise in a separate essay (https://emptyblogvoices.blogspot.com/2020/02/does-russell-mccutcheon-require-realism.html). Though, it can be said here that the core problem is that Schilbrack’s argument takes a western, predominantly positivist idea of academic meaning and naturalises it. He assumes, in other words, that our arguments about reality are only meaningful if they hook up to the world at it is – as it exists objectively – and that their value will reassert itself in every context, in every historical moment, as the reality our arguments point to, and the logic which underpins them, are universal and timeless. But, on closer analysis, it can be demonstrated, following the terms of Schilbrack’s own realist logic, that meaning must rest on non-realist epistemology and ontology; instead, it is realist epistemological theories which, being unable to explain how they acquire knowledge of realist facts, are unable to make coherent positive arguments.

The second philosophical presumption Schilbrack’s metaphysical reading of religion rests on is, as I have said, ontological. It is the idea that non-realist, or constructed reality, can co-exist and relate with realist, or unconstructed reality. Unfortunately, Schilbrack does not unpack how critical realism is possible and why it corrects ontological difficulties which are unique to non-realism, and so there is little for me to engage with. Needless to say, however, maintaining that religion is partially constructed but part realist, entangles Schilbrack in a myriad of philosophical issues. For instance, are there two ontological tiers which form religion, one which is constructed and one which is not? If so, how do they relate? If they do relate, how can one maintain that the unconstructed parts are unaffected by the constructed parts in a way that keeps them unconstructed? If Schilbrack suggests that they exist separately, how is he going to argue for this position? If there are two essentially separate ontological realities, why label both as instances of religion? These are just a few questions which pose a fundamental challenge to the idea of critical realism. It could well be that Schilbrack has answers to each of these questions, but as he does not articulate them within his essay, and so there is little more I can say here.

Though, when it comes to the issue of question-begging, Schilbrack’s three-fold criticism of McCutcheon, which makes up the heart of his essay, is even worse – and as there is more material to engage with here, I shall now move onto these critiques.

 3

Schilbrack notes that in his most recent book, Fabricating Religion (2019), McCutcheon makes three arguments in defence of non-realist readings of religion. Schilbrack suggests that each reason is flawed and instead show why a realist reading of religion is not only possible but required. Though the problem is he does not demonstrate this; he just states it. Thus, Schilbrack notes that, for McCutcheon, because the semantic content of religion is dependent upon its opposite, the secular, in the web of language construction, one cannot say that religion has a realist essence. Schilbrack labels this the “the co-dependent meaning argument” (4). In response, Schilbrack argues that:

The fact that concepts depend for their meaning on relations to other concepts does not undermine their ability separately to refer to things in the world; on the contrary, it makes such reference possible. […]. Even though left and right are co-constituted as a binary pair, with neither appearing first nor one exclusively anchoring the other, it does not follow that left and right collapse as analytic categories, nor that we should discard the use of the terms, nor that one should only study those who use these labels. (4-5)

But why does it not follow? Why is it the case that we should not abandon objective understandings of such terms as left and right? No reasons are given. Schilbrack does say that just because somebody cannot understand a binary unless they have access to a language framework which lays it out, this does not mean that a binary could not exist in historical reality – before it was conceptualised, that is. Thus, he states that:

The claim that human societies at one point in time were religious-not-secular before the binary emerged is just as coherent as the claim that at one point they were all hunter-gatherer-not-agricultural even though that binary did not emerge until centuries later. (5) 

But this example does nothing – it just kicks the can down the road. Schilbrack assumes that everyone must naturally agree that hunger-gathers existed in an objective sense before the concept of agriculture, and that, naturally, everyone should see how this example extends to the question of the religion and secular dichotomy. Though this is an extreme example of question-begging; Schilbrack provides no reason why this assumption about hunter-gathers should be made, and nor is it the case that people naturally do make it. Indeed, the hunter-gather example is a weak one as one can easily argue that it is as equally anachronistic as the category of religion.

The argument that the category of religion is anachronistic is the second argument Schilbrack’s identifies as being made by McCutcheon. Schilbrack admits that, as a realist, he is using the term religion anachronistically, ‘Because realism is the view that there are structures in the natural and social environments operating whether or not we recognise them, realists may apply labels that those so described do not know’ (5). In defence of using the term religion in such a way, he says that there are no logical difficulties as it is a ‘commonplace practise’ (5). But, again, this defence does nothing. Many scholars use the term religion anachronistically, but why does that make it OK from the perspective of philosophy and metaphysics? Schilbrack suggests, following an argument developed by Robert Segal (2006), that academics know more about the objective world than ordinary people do themselves. Thus, even if people of the past did not know they engaged in religion, we enlightened, better-informed scholars do know – ‘just as a doctor can tell a patient that he has melanoma, and the doctor can be correct whether the patient knows that term or not, the same is true of the term “religion”’ (5). The arrogance of this argument is shocking and again provides no justifying logic. Indeed, this argument for a realist reading of religion can be summed up thus: ‘religion does exist in a realist sense, and I know this because I am better informed than you, so keep quiet and trust my word.’ I would get a second opinion.

Though Schilbrack does make one last attempt to defend realist anachronism. He notes how McCutcheon uses the example of literacy to argue against the idea that an objective reality can exist outside of discourse. In response, Schilbrack states that ‘Literacy, like religion, is precisely a historically emergent social structure that exists with effects on societies and psyches, even in cases when those so described do not know the term’ (6). Again, where is the justification? Once again, the conclusion has been stated as if it provided a definitive truth. But also, the example is again flawed. The concept of literacy can be shown to be a social construct, just like religion. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that many of the French critical theorists, who introduced the non-realist influence into the Study of Religion which McCutcheon is an inheritor of, used examples from language and literature to argue their case. But even on its own terms, the example is weak. First, if religion is historically emergent, in what sense is it realist? Standard definitions of ‘realism’ tend to point to the idea that certain aspects of reality exist inherently – that is, they cannot change, or at least their essence cannot, and that they exist timelessly. Realist reality provides an ontological foundation which prohibits the possibility of their construction, as to be constructed would mean to exist without an unchanging essence. The issue of Schilbrack’s understanding of realism will be taken up later. But even if we ignore the idea that realist reality is constructed while somehow existing objectively, Schilbrack argues that religion exists as a social structure which impacts upon social groups and individuals. But to make this claim, one must assume that a division between these actors and agents already exist. How can one make this assumption? Do these dividing lines exist objectively too? Schilbrack makes no argument to suggest so. Indeed, on Schilbrack view, religion would seem to depend on the social groups and individuals it impacts and vice versa. In what way, then, does Schilbrack’s example support the idea that religion exists objectively in a manner which allows it to be identified anachronistically? 

The final argument McCutcheon makes is that religion lacks distinctive characteristics in a way which allows it to be separated from culture. Schilbrack responds by saying:

The key here is to be clear whether a critic of “religion” is arguing, as I do, that religion is not separable from the rest of culture, or the scholar is arguing more radically, as McCutcheon does, that religion is not even distinguishable from the rest of culture. (6)

The argument for a continuum of differentiation is not a problem. But why does this support a realist reading of religion? Can it not be the case that religion is a social construct, that it can be distinguished from other aspects of culture, but that this act of distinction is also an act of social construction? If Schilbrack wants to inject some realism here, he has to either suggest that culture exists in a realist manner and that the chopping up of culture into differentiated components is an act of social construction, in which case his argument is not an argument for a realist understanding of religion but a realist understanding of culture. Or he must suggest that the chopping up of culture is realist – that is, religion is distinguished from the rest of culture as it possesses a realist essence which makes religion and culture incompatible. But Schilbrack has already argued against this latter position. Though Schilbrack continues to elaborate:

The claim above that religion is one form of culture among others already distinguishes the two conceptually without separating them; analogously, even though one cannot have an apple without having fruit, “apple” and “fruit” are still analytically distinct. One cultural form can also be distinguished from other cultural forms, even when they pervade or are coextensive with each other. (6)

But this does not resolve the above issues. If cultural forms exist in a realist manner, as Schilbrack at least suggests religion does, they will have to have a realist relationship with each other. They are, then, either essentially connected or essentially separated. The problem is that neither possibility allows the conclusions Schilbrack wants, and the argument that they are both – essentially connected and separated at the same time – is logically incoherent. The type of relationship Schilbrack wants religion to have with culture is only possible if one adopts a non-realist reading.

4

Schilbrack’s realist argument has so far been found to be logically inconsistent and question-begging. But there two final parts of his argument that we need to examine. The first can be dealt with quickly. Schilbrack lists numerous critical religion scholars whose work, on closer analysis, seem to suggest critical realist commitments (7-8). Schilbrack does this to suggest that McCutcheon is a lone wolf. Though this is not an argument which engages with logic or metaphysics – it is a delegitimisation strategy which offers nothing of interest.

Schilbrack’s final argument against McCutcheon exposes a significant flaw in his understanding of realism, which implicitly impacts the logical coherence of the whole essay. Throughout his essay, Schilbrack establishes a dichotomy between realism and non-realism, but he also establishes another, between materialism and idealism. The problem is that Schilbrack seems to suggest throughout that these dichotomies are synonymous. His does this silently and without any justification; however, it becomes a major problem when he uses the materialist and idealist distinction to argue that McCutcheon’s work is inconsistent and requires a dose of realism. Schilbrack notes that in McCutcheon’s early work (2001), he emphasised the materialist influence behind the construction of ‘religion’ – how such constructions were the result of broader social forces, defined by power relations and much else besides – which impacted upon individuals with little control over those social structures. This, Schilbrack argues, is incompatible with McCutcheon’s more recent (2019) emphasis on discourse, conceptualisation and language in the construction of ‘religion’.

The problem here is that materialism does not equate with realism. Common definitions of realism within metaphysics, as I noted above, describe realism as a commitment to fundamental realities which exist with essences and which are not constructed in any sense. Traditionally, realists do not argue that there are fundamental realities, but that they are only unconstructed from the side of individuals. Indeed, it is entirely possible to be a non-realist and to engage with materialism and not just idealism, as a non-realist wants to suggest that they are co-dependent. If McCutcheon was an idealist in a strong sense, then he would likely be committed to the argument that the mind provides a foundational ontological reality. In other words, pure idealists are often not non-realists. The fact, then, that Schilbrack equates the two is suspicious and deeply misleading. So it is not inconsistent for McCutcheon to emphasise the role of social forces in his early work only to then emphasise the role of discourse in his later work, as the two are interrelated – they inform each other; materialism is dependent upon idealism and idealism is dependent upon materialism. The fact that McCutcheon emphasises one aspect of that relationship in a piece of work tells us nothing more than the fact he decided, for strategic reasons, that such an emphasis was of interest not only for himself but, also, for his readers at a particular time.

Moreover, there is a further consequence of materialism being compatible with non-realism. It also means that Schilbrack’s arguments in favour of materialism do not support his critical realism. The reasons why should be evident from the above, but they become painfully obvious when Schilbrack unpacks his thought based upon the assumption that materialism equates to realism. This can be seen when Schilbrack tries to explain how materialism is compatible with critical realism:

Material conditions of human behaviour do not exist only in the natural world. I argued above that a critical realist will distinguish between things that do not depend for their existence on human concepts (like carbon and stars) and those that do (like traffic laws and private property). Within this latter category, a critical realist account of social structures will further distinguish between concept-dependent realities that are merely subjective and those that have become objective. (9; emphasis added)

This quote brings many questions to mind. But the main issue resolves around explaining the relationship between constructed and objective reality, even from a materialist perspective. For instance, how can something become a realist reality? The idea that something obtains objectivity suggests that it is constructed and subject to change. Is it possible, for instance, that religion can lose its objectivity in the same way it gains it? Religion might be a realist reality today, but tomorrow, who knows?

The logical incoherence of the materialist/critical realist position is further exposed when Schilbrack tries to further explain how the relationship between realist materialism and non-realist conceptualisation would make sense in such a framework. He states:

On this account, even though human beings invented the concepts of genes, germs, the French Revolution, white privilege, and so on, these concepts are not like virtual reality glasses that trick one into thinking that there is a world independent of one’s mind, but rather like barbecue tongs: flawed tools designed to grasp real things. (11)

But how can socially constructed categories be used to access a realist realm of truth (see https://emptyblogvoices.blogspot.com/2020/02/does-russell-mccutcheon-require-realism.html)? Moreover, how can they achieve this without changing ‘real things’, causing them to be constructed and, hence, not real in a realist sense? The bottom line is that Schilbrack is coming unstuck at the issue of explaining the co-dependence of materialism and idealism whilst also committing himself to a critical realist metaphysics. But this, as I have suggested above, is not a problem for the non-realist as, in their view, everything is constructed – everything is dependent.

Conclusion

This essay does not touch on every aspect of Schilbrack’s argument and is, consequently, likely to be unfair in some regards. However, I have tried to engage with Schilbrack’s argument when it has been substantive, and I have also responded to the core points he makes. Though I am sure this essay has its many failings, I hope I have nonetheless presented a convincing case as to why a realist, not non-realist, approach to the Study of Religion is problematic. I say this, as this debate is of great importance, and Schilbrack is right to note this point and the fact that he and Russell McCutcheon are on entirely different pages when it comes to metaphysics – representing a broader division within the critical religion academy. As I have argued, however, Schilbrack’s suggestion that critical religion should move in a critical realist direction is flawed – logically, on its own terms, realism falls apart.

Critical religion should recognise the metaphysical division that is opening up but be more explicit as to why the label ‘critical’ should be applied to those scholars who are non-realists; not critical realists. If being critical means deconstructing realist understandings of discursive reality, why should we now adopt a critical realist approach which would require critical scholars to, arbitrarily, leave some stones unturned? Why should we deconstruct, say, reifications of Hinduism – reifications which suggest it is not a colonial construct – but not do the same with the category of religion itself at a metaphysical level? Schilbrack offers few reasons, and those he does offer are problematic. However, the contribution Schilbrack makes to this metaphysical debate is welcome and it is my wish that this essay, like his, has moved this important debate forward.

Jack Lewis Graham