Empty Voices

What did it? Did Labour lose in 2019 because of Corbyn or Brexit? Answers to this question tend to reflect an ideological divide within the Labour Party. Those who tend to be on the right of the Party, and who were not supporters of Corbyn, suggest that the disastrous result of 2019 was mainly the fault of the leader. Conversely, those who are on the left of the Party, and who were supporters of Corbyn, suggest that Brexit, in particular, Labour’s second referendum policy, was the main cause of Labour’s defeat. This latter group often mention that Corbyn was a variable in 2017 when the Labour Party did much better than expected, and in 2019 and so blame cannot be placed primarily at his door. While I identify as being on the left of the Labour Party and have consistently supported Corbyn during the most difficult years of his leadership, it is not true to suggest that the Corbyn variable was the same in 2019 as it was in 2017. That is, the Corbyn of 2019 was different from the

Kevin Schilbrack (2020) claims that for readings of religion to have academic value, they must be able to demonstrate that they are accurate. This, he further claims, requires a realist ontology where the accuracy of arguments depend on their ability to hook up to an objective reality, which, regardless of the time and place the researcher finds themselves, presents itself to us. This being the case, Schilbrack contends that Russell McCutcheon’s non-realist reading of religion is meaningless as if it is true, it could only be so if it pointed to an objective fact about religion; though, if this is the case, then the idea that religion is non-realist falls apart. Schilbrack believes this series of logical inferences produces a reductio ad absurdum of McCutcheon’s position which he cannot escape. However, there are numerous reasons which can be offered which not only provide McCutcheon with an escape but which also demonstrate that, conversely, it is realist arguments which fall into a

Introduction In this essay, I respond to Kevin Schilbrack’s (2020) realist critique of Russell McCutcheon’s non-realist theory of religion. Instead of non-realist constructions of religion being metaphysically flawed, I argue that  Schilbrack’s realist reading is both logically inconsistent and question-begging. Following the structure of Schilbrack’s essay, I begin by outlining his primary position and then move on to challenge two realist assumptions which underpin it. First, I challenge Schilbrack’s realist epistemological assumption that a non-realist reading of religion requires a realist epistemology, grounded in a realist ontology, if it is not to fall into meaningless relativism. Second, I raise several questions concerning the critical realist assumption that it is metaphysically and logically possible to maintain the co-existence of constructed and unconstructed realities. After challenging these metaphysical standpoints, I engage with the heart of Schilbrack’s essay –