Jon P. Mitchell, Geertz and Asad: Shared Ontology, Different Emphasis

Ever since Talal Asad penned his critique of Clifford Geertz’s (1993) definition of religion, a consensus has developed that both scholars are operating within different ontological frameworks. Jon P. Mitchell (2017), in his chapter ‘Defining Religion: Geertz and Asad’, supports such a consensus. Mitchell contends that Geertz offers a universal and essentialist definition of religion, whereas Asad offers a contextualist and discursive theory of religion. However, these differences fall apart under analysis. While it is true that Geertz and Asad disagree on many points, such disagreements are primarily based on different emphasises and agendas, not different ontological paradigms.  

In ‘Religion as a Cultural System’, Geertz defines religion as

(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men [sic] by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions of a general order of existence and aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. (90; emphasis in original.

As Mitchell notes, the core purpose of Geertz’s definition is to highlight religion’s supposed unique functional ability to unite macro worldviews with people’s micro experiences of them – producing self-reinforcing and co-dependent plausibility structures which enable a cultural system to sustain itself (328). But, by doing so, Geertz separates religion from other elements of culture, such as the artistic and political. It is this latter point, Mitchell explains, which Asad found most problematic.

For Asad, by separating religion from other spheres of cultural life, Geertz is naturalising a western typological paradigm, ignoring the fact that what counts as knowledge is contextually dependent and due to power relations operating at the level of discourse (330). Indeed, for Asad, the separation of religion from, for instance, politics, finds its legitimacy in European and Christian discourses where religion is traditionally constructed as distinct from so-called secular culture. The problem is that such a view of religion fails to appreciate the composition of religion in non-western societies – in particular, Islamic societies where ‘religion and power are interlinked to the extent that they are analytically inseparable’ (330). This, in turn, has fuelled an ‘approach to non-Christian societies – and particularly Muslim societies – which are habitually vilified because of an apparent inability to separate religion and politics’ (330). Indeed, these issues with presenting religion as a hermetically sealed entity mean that Asad ‘questions not only the essence of Geertz’s definition, but the very search for essence’ (330).

But while Asad’s argument has many merits, his ontological criticisms of Geertz miss the mark. For instance, Asad’s thesis is that Geertz’s definition attempts to capture the essence of religion, thereby naturalising and universalising western social structures and knowledge. But Geertz does not support essential definitions and thus does not support the essential division of cultures. Indeed, Geertz’s interpretative anthropology is founded upon the notion that the makeup of cultures is contextually dependent and interconnected, with universalisms being an impossibility. For example, on the question of essences, Geertz, in his chapter ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture’, references an Indian story to explain his ontological standpoint.

There is an Indian story – at least I heard it as an Indian story – about an Englishman who, having being told that the world rested on a platform which rested on the back of an elephant which rested in turn on the back of a turtle, asked […] what did the turtle rest on? Another turtle. And that turtle? “Ah. Sahib, after that it is turtles all the way down.” (29)   

The philosophical message of this story is that there is no ultimate ontological foundation upon which the world rests – that is, there is no essential core at the heart of reality – be it cultural or otherwise – ‘it is turtles all the way down.’ Importantly, Geertz states that this story refers to what he believes to be ‘the condition of all things.’ Because of this ontological standpoint, Geertz goes on to argue that he has never ‘gotten anywhere near the bottom of anything I have ever written about’ – and that ‘Cultural analysis is intrinsically incomplete’ (29). Thus, Geertz rejects the possibility of elements of reality existing in an unconditioned, objective and unchanging state – and, therefore, the possibility of essential definitions or theories. Additionally, on the question of universals, Geertz argues in the same chapter that for any anthropological study

To set forth symmetrical crystals of significance, purified of the material complexity in which they were located, and then attribute their existence to autogenous principles of order, universal properties of the human mind, or vast, a priori weltanschauungen, is to pretend a science that does not exist and imagine a reality that cannot be found. Cultural analysis is (or should be) guessing at meanings, assessing the guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions for better guesses, not discovering the Continent of Meaning and mapping out its bodiless landscape. (20)

 Hence, taken together, Geertz argues against essentialism in cultural analysis, mainly due to the fact no essence can be found upon analysis, and against the ability to craft universal theories, suggesting such attempts to turn anthropology into a pseudo-science have no ontological justification (see also Geertz, 1993, 313). At this point, however, it would be legitimate to ask why, if Geertz does reject an essentialist ontology and universalisms, he constructs a definition of religion which seems to be both essentialist and universal, as Mitchell, following Asad, suggests. Here, reference must be made to Geertz’s preamble before his definition of religion.

Let us, therefore, reduce our paradigm to a definition, for, although it is notorious that definitions establish nothing, in themselves they do, if they are carefully enough constructed, provide a useful orientation, or reorientation, of thought, such that an extended unpacking of them can be an effective way of developing and controlling a novel line of inquiry. (90; emphasis added) 

That is, Geertz is fully aware that definitions are constructed and contextually dependent. He is aware, moreover, that because of these factors, definitions cannot establish anything essential or universal. But, for Geertz, that does not mean definitions cannot be hermeneutically useful in the guessing game of interpretative anthropology. Mitchell even acknowledges that later in his career, Geertz was more forceful in dismissing the importance of definitions. But, Mitchell contends, ‘his attempt to define religion nevertheless had an important theoretical purpose: to give analytical priority and autonomy to religion as an area of human life and experience’ (325; emphasis in original). Though, has stated above, Geertz never intended to give essential analytical priory, nor essential autonomy, to religion. This distinction matters as Asad’s critique is partly ontological, making the argument that Geertz is naturalising, via an essentialist definition, European and Christian constructions of knowledge.

It is wrong to suggest, then, as Michell does, that there exists a gulf between the ontological standpoint of Geertz and Asad. Such an argument is grounded in Asad’s misreading of Geertz’s position. Instead, both Asad and Geertz base their work in anti-essentialist paradigms – both acknowledging that meaning is contextually dependent and cannot, therefore, be universal. The most significant difference between Geertz and Asad is one of emphasis. Geertz is more concerned with constructing definitions, regardless of the issues involved in doing so, as they enable his interpretative anthropology. Conversely, Asad is concerned with discursive constructions, the ideologies behind them and the power relations they enforce. Both enterprises are different but not ontologically exclusive.

Jack Lewis Graham

 

References

 

§  Mitchell, P. J. (2017). Defining Religion: Geertz and Asad. In King, R. (ed.). Religion, Theory, Critique: Classic and Contemporary Approaches and Methodologies. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 327-334.   

§  Geertz, C. (1993). The Interpretation of Cultures. London: Fontana Press.