The Failure of Corbynism's New Type of Politics

What did it? Did Labour lose in 2019 because of Corbyn or Brexit? Answers to this question tend to reflect an ideological divide within the Labour Party. Those who tend to be on the right of the Party, and who were not supporters of Corbyn, suggest that the disastrous result of 2019 was mainly the fault of the leader. Conversely, those who are on the left of the Party, and who were supporters of Corbyn, suggest that Brexit, in particular, Labour’s second referendum policy, was the main cause of Labour’s defeat. This latter group often mention that Corbyn was a variable in 2017 when the Labour Party did much better than expected, and in 2019 and so blame cannot be placed primarily at his door.

While I identify as being on the left of the Labour Party and have consistently supported Corbyn during the most difficult years of his leadership, it is not true to suggest that the Corbyn variable was the same in 2019 as it was in 2017. That is, the Corbyn of 2019 was different from the Corbyn of 2017, and that difference was not a positive one and, consequently, contributed to the 2019 defeat. I have already spoken about how the Corbyn variable changed a bit before in a previous blog post, but here I what to flesh out this idea. The first thing to say, then, following a Marxist analysis of history, is that to focus on Corbyn the individual would be a mistake. Corbyn represented a type of politics – Corbynism – and it is here that our analysis should be grounded.

But what is Corbynism? Most on the right would suggest it is a personality cult. This is not, and never was the case. Corbynism consisted of two elements: first, a commitment to socialist policy and values; and, secondly, a commitment to a different type of politics. The latter itself consisted of three main components: first, it was anti-spin (‘straight-talking, honest politics’); second, it was populist and anti-triangulation/technocratic; finally, it was movement-based; not top-down. My point is that in 2017 both elements of Corbynism were alive – they may have been dented somewhat from their original birth in the 2015 leadership election, but their existence could still be discerned. By 2019, however, only the first element – the commitment to socialist policy and values – was alive (the 2019 manifesto was more radical than the 2017 manifesto). It was this change in Corbynism which helps explain why Corbyn managed to have a successful election in 2017 but a disastrous one in 2019, and why people are partially right when they argue that is was because of Corbyn that Labour lost in 2019.

My point can be illustrated by looking at Labour’s handling of Brexit – this example is also useful as it demonstrates the inability of separating the unpopularity of Corbynism and Labour’s Brexit position. The final Brexit position that Labour landed on – the position of a second referendum – destroyed all three characteristics of Corbynism’s new type of politics. First, it was not anti-spin and straight-talking. It was a position which was formed by taking an overtly calculating look at the composition of Labour’s electoral coalitions and their likely movements; it was never a position which was adopted from principle. Moreover, it was never a position Corbyn seemed intellectually or emotionally invested in. Indeed, during the 2015 leadership contest, Corbyn would not state how he would campaign in the then-upcoming EU referendum, only saying that Labour needed to challenge Cameron’s terms of negotiation. Though, knowing that Corbyn himself is a Bennite, and knowing that Tony Benn would in all likelihood have campaigned and voted to leave the EU in 2016, we could suggest that Corbyn, had he not been elected leader, would have done something similar.

Second, Labour’s Brexit policy was an example of triangulation politics at its worse. It was convoluted and engaged in the type of compromise which pleases nobody. The idea that Labour would renegotiate a new deal with the EU, which it would then put to a public vote, which Labour members of parliament would be allowed to campaign and vote against, with the leader staying neutral, was even messier than Ed Miliband’s austerity-lite twaddle. All this compared badly with the Conservatives simple ‘Get Brexit Done’ message, which many agree was highly effective.

Third, and finally, the Brexit position was only decided upon after a long process which was drawn out mainly because of the central Party’s suppression of the grassroots. In 2018 it was clear that Labour Party members wanted to support a second referendum policy, but after several movements behind the scenes, a half-baked compromise was decided upon at conference. This did not stop, though, the demand for another referendum and only served to alienate members. Thus, in 2019, Labour was forced into supporting another referendum and the architect of that policy, Keir Starmer, is now miles ahead in a Labour Leadership election many thought a socialist, like Corbyn, would win hands down.

What is tragic is that the type of politics that Corbynism initially represented is still popular – as evidenced by the failure of Theresa May and the success of Boris Johnson. Indeed, the failure of Corbynism is not that it was too radical, but that it failed to stay true to the original political vision it articulated in 2015 and 2017. This point is an important one as Rebecca Long-Bailey will have little hope of winning the leadership election if she exclusively talks about being more left-wing than the other candidates. She needs, also, to show how she is going to resurrect the new type of politics that Corbynism discussed but ultimately failed to bring about in practice. RLB’s commitment to open selection, further devolution, and an elected House of Lords is therefore welcome. But more will have to be done to excite members and craft clear dividing lines between herself and the other candidates. If she does not, then it is almost guaranteed that members, traumatised and shattered from the 2019 election, will play it safe and choose, in Keir Starmer, a more polished version of Ed Miliband.

Jack Lewis Graham