Tim Farron and the Redemption of Liberalism

Tim Farron was the leader of the Liberal Democrats from 2015 to 2017. Farron resigned as leader after a general election campaign which saw him come under continuous pressure over the compatibility between his socially conservative theological views – in particular, his belief that gay sex is a sin – and his self-classification as a liberal. In his book, A Better Ambition: Confessions of a Faithful Liberal, Farron (2019) suggests that his experience as Liberal Democrat leader gave him a unique insight not only into the interaction between religious and political discourses in Britain but the state of liberalism also. For Farron, his experience has led him to believe that the latter is under threat – in particular, liberalism is ‘…under threat from the inside, from itself and from mistaken understanding of what liberalism is among people who think they are liberals’ (223).

 In chapter 10 of his book, ‘Redeeming Liberalism’, Farron argues that ‘…liberalism does not seem terribly liberal’ (225). He suggests there is a rigorous policing of public discourses which close debates regarded as unsuitable. But instead of these developments enraging supporters of the liberal creed, ‘…they have too often become red meat to a liberal orthodoxy that seeks to eviscerate blasphemers’ (226). Farron suggests that one of the reasons for these illiberal developments is the ironic dominance of liberalism itself. That is, liberalism has become so normative and naturalised in the West that any attempt to disagree with it is met with outright hostility. In other words, liberalism as an ideology has become so integral to the production and reproduction of Western societies that it has constructed plausibility structures which only it can satisfy – creating a situation of liberal oppression (234-5).      

For Farron, the best means to return to proper liberalism is Christianity as one of the most significant barriers is relativism. He argues that Christianity provided the justification and legitimation for liberal democracy in the 19^th century and has often been at the forefront of liberal movements – for instance, the abolition of slavery. In the main, Christianity achieved this by professing ‘…the value of the individual, and the equality of all before God’ (241). And these values are essential if societies are to become more open and tolerant – providing, as they do, a foundation for fundamental human rights. But, Farron further suggests, these values of individuality and equality must be eternal if they are to be liberal and therefore must be based on a realist Christian theology. That is, ‘If our values are relativistic, if they are shifting, and if they depend upon the temporary norms of this age, then the freedoms you bank upon today cannot be guaranteed tomorrow. Our liberties are in the hands of unstable forces – we cannot have confidence that our rights will still be our rights from one generation to the next because we cannot call upon any authority in support of those rights’. Farron continues, ‘In discarding Christianity, we kick away the foundations of liberalism and democracy and so we cannot then be surprised when what we call liberalism stops being liberal. Relativism is not liberalism. Relativism is the gateway to tyranny’ (241).

But Farron’s thesis is characterised by an internal contradiction. He argues against the naturalisation of liberalism in Western societies as it has resulted in liberal oppression – that is, liberal creeds have been presented as realist facts so that anybody who disagrees with them – as Farron does by believing that gay sex is a sin – is classified as not properly liberal. For Farron, following John S. Mill, liberalism should always allow for debate to avoid the ‘tyranny of opinion’. But there is no logical difference between the reification of contemporary liberal discourses and the reification of Christian theology. Farron seems to want to remove the illiberal character of contemporary liberalism via the application of a realist Christian theology. Though this creates the same problem with a different face. That is to say, Farron argues against the realism of liberalism – suggesting it creates societies where alternative views cannot be aired or gain credence – only to argue that the solution is to replace the realism of liberalism with the realism of Christianity, arguing that relativism is the gateway to tyranny even though it is realism – the primary opponent of relativism – which has been his main target (241).

Indeed, the claim that relativism is the gateway to tyranny, whereas a realist theology is the gateway to liberalism, is questionable. There are many varieties of relativism, both ontological, epistemological and ethical, some of which might result in tyrannical conclusions, either practically or logically. But it is hard to understand how a non-realist, relativist worldview, which holds there are no final answers at an ultimate level, can be accused of leading to oppression when the alternative – realism – is a worldview dependent upon the idea of eternal truths which cannot be challenged or debated. For instance, Farron’s suggestion that liberal values are precarious is right. But they are not made more precarious by pointing out their social construction. Indeed, the realisation that reality is socially constructed can inspire one to defend such constructions, helping to ensure their continuation – not via reification but via intersubjective debate and persuasion. The latter is what Farron claims he wants – indeed, he states that ‘Societies that close off debate are not liberal societies’ (81). But an open debate is a possibility he denies by reifying the parameters of acceptable discussion by marrying liberal discourse to a realist Christian theology. A non-realist relativism, which argues that any collective opinion is subject to change, at least allows for the possibility of debate and revision; a chance which is removed by realism. 

As Farron constructs it, any redemption of liberalism is not going to be obtained via the enforcement of a Christian realism, but via a thoroughgoing non-realism which argues for the construction and reconstruction of liberal discourses within social, cultural and economic contexts.

Jack Lewis Graham