A Critical Reflection on the Commission on Religious Education’s Final Report
In September 2018, the Commission on Religious Education (CoRE) published their final report, Religion and Worldviews: The Way Forward. I am late to read this report and have thus missed the initial discussion it has generated. Following the Welsh government’s recent adoption of key aspects of the report's recommendations, however, I wish to make a few, hopefully constructive, comments. Specifically, I wish to focus my remarks on those proposals aimed at renaming RE and repurposing RE.
Troubling ‘Worldviews’
At the heart of CoRE’s report is the suggestion to change the name of ‘Religious Education’ to ‘Religion and Worldviews’. This proposal has generated considerable debate; a fact which is not surprising considering the decades-long prevalence of definitional questions in the academic Study of Religion. Indeed, questions around definition have been picking up at a critical, postmodern pace since the 90s onwards, further intensifying discussions (McCutcheon, 1997; Fitzgerald, 2000; Beckford, 2003). The problem is that the arguments made during these decade-long debates seem to have had only a slight impact on the recommended name change – a change which might have been cutting edge in the 70s and 80s; not in 2018 (see Geertz, 1974; Smith, 1975; 1982).
The report’s authors suggest they adopt the category ‘worldview’ to draw attention to ‘the complex, diverse and plural nature of worldviews’ (5). This commitment to diversity is strengthened by the report’s distinction between ‘institutional worldview’ (‘organised worldviews shared among particular groups and sometimes embedded in institutions’) and ‘personal worldview’ (‘an individual’s own way of understanding and living in the world, which may or may not draw from one, or many, institutional worldviews’) (2). The commitment to challenge metanarratives, and essentialist, stereotypical thought is welcome. Indeed, as the report notes, stereotypical thinking is often encouraged in current uncritical RE practice. The problem is that the report’s commitment is not consistent.
The report repeatedly states that some worldviews are religious while others are non-religious. But how is this classification made? The suggestion that certain views are religious by nature is one of the most essentialist, uncritical claims one can make in the field of the Study of Religion. There is little evidence that the work of critical scholars, such as Johnathan Z. Smith, Timothy Fitzgerald, etc., has been adequately incorporated here. The classifications ‘religion’ and non-religion’ are political acts; they are not neutral, apolitical objective statements. Such uncritical claims, then, put in doubt the report’s suggestion that Religion and Worldview studies are informed by the best recent academic research.
But even if we accept the labels of religious and non-religious worldviews, the report says little about what would be included within these categories. For instance, would the worldviews of conservativism, environmentalism, or nudism be included? If not, why not? The report gives the impression that the worldview net should be cast widely, lamenting the use of essentialist typologies, such as the world religion typology. However, the report seems to contradict itself by suggesting, for example, that more needs to be done to include the study of ‘Hinduism, Buddhism and Sikhism’ (4). I have no issue with including non-western ‘worldviews’ into British classrooms; the problem is that the classification of these worldviews is based on colonial constructed categories of predominately western origin (Masuzawa, 2005).
The report’s interpretation of non-religious worldviews is no better. While acknowledging that political philosophies could be included in non-religious worldview studies, whenever examples are given, the study of Humanism or Secularism is often referenced (4). These suggestions are narrowminded and fail to appreciate the diversity amongst those who identify as non-religious. Indeed, if the report suggests that studying six world religions leads to stereotypical, essentialist conclusions, I fail to see how the study of Humanism and Secularism, with maybe a bit of Marx throw-in, is going to challenge such thought on the non-religious side – assuming there is such a dichotomy! It is hard to avoid the impression that the ‘non-religious worldviews’ is an “other” category.
Moreover, if the worldview semantic net could be cast as widely as I suggest, and there are no logical reasons given in the report why it cannot, why separate Religion and Worldviews from the studies of science or history, or even business. All disciplines operate within a worldview, and any study of them will, inevitably, include a study of those worldviews themselves. If this is the case, there would seem little point in having a separate discipline of worldview studies – the term, like religion before it, would be vacuous. Maybe one could suggest that Religion and Worldviews is different because it studies worldviews which are either religious or related to religion. This, however, as I have suggested, is lazy and essentialist and does not move us on from current, flawed practice.
The category worldview is also based on idealist assumptions. That is, the study of worldviews privileges cognitive content over social content, taking a Weberian view of history and social change; a view itself based on a Protestant theological bias. This is not to suggest that a Marxist, materialist framework should be adopted instead – such a stance is equally, if not more, problematic. The problem, though, is that while the report acknowledges that worldviews provide accounts ‘of the nature of reality’ and ‘influence behaviour, institutions and forms of expression’ (4), it fails to emphasise that this is a reciprocal relationship – that is, behaviours, institutions and wider social forces also influence the constructions of worldviews and what is considered to be the nature of reality (again, cf. Durkheim, 1913).
However, notwithstanding the above, the report is right to acknowledge the power of ideas in the construction of our social worlds and therefore our engagement with them. Studying worldviews in a critical, postmodern way – conceptualising worldviews as means by which we construct reality – would help to establish the fact that there are different ways of viewing the world – helping, in other words, to challenge realist logic at the heart of dangerous essentialist and stereotypical arguments. This will help students better understand the actions of others, even if they operate within different ontological and epistemological frameworks. Though, the key is to point out that the idea of choice in the construction and acceptance of certain worldviews is limited, if not non-existent. It is therefore vital that the influence of certain power relations in the construction of worldviews is examined – forcing students to critically question why they, as well as others, believe what they do. While the report does, admittedly, briefly acknowledge this more critical area of study, it would be desirable if this element was focused on more.
Confused Purpose of RE
One of the major issues facing RE, apart from weak institutional support, is its lack of identity (5). What is the purpose of RE? Though the report acknowledges an absence of identity as a problem and suggests that its recommendations provide a solution, I was left with a different impression; I felt that a confused sense of identity ran through much of the report. In particular, there was a tension between whether Religion and Worldviews is meant to be a descriptive enterprise, primarily aimed to teach respect and tolerance, or whether it is meant to be a critical academic endeavour. One got the sense that worldviews would be the focus of study in the classroom to prepare liberal, respectable citizens for the world of work within a multicultural society; not to pass on critical thinking skills which can then be applied in multiple contexts.
I do not wish to enter the wider debate on the role of education in society here. But there are two serious issues with the report’s attempt to construct Religion and Worldviews as a descriptive, tolerance focused subject – a subject ethos which is not that different from current, flawed practice (see the work done by Ninian Smart). First, descriptive studies, as I have already argued, help to reinforce essentialist thinking. Admittedly, a greater emphasis on the diversity of worldviews would help here. But by laying down conceptual, semantic boundaries, and implying that these boundaries represent life outside of the classroom in an objective sense, one cannot avoid encouraging unhelpful, stereotypical reasoning. Moreover, and again as I have already mentioned, if the semantic range of worldviews is going to be cast widely, making it impossible to exclude anything, how is it going to be possible to articulate a strong identity for RE?
Second, work by Tenzan Eaghll (2017) has challenged the idea that learning about religions or worldviews, from a largely fact-based approach, leads to greater respect or tolerance. This is not just because descriptive pedagogical methods reinforce a stereotypical style of thinking, but because supporting diversity is different from supporting inclusion. For instance, diversity is critiqued as only referring to the assimilation of difference within a dominant framework established by those in current positions of power – social gatekeepers. Diversity agendas, then, can be interpreted as tokenistic, where the mere presence of marginalised groups or people is seen as an achievement (cf. the report’s call for the presence of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Sikhism without questioning the logic which underpins those categories). The problem is dominant frameworks are not sufficiently challenged by the presence of new, previously marginalised, groups. Inclusion, conversely, references those efforts made to modify dominant structures in line with the reasoning, workings and ideas of newly incorporated groups.
In the case of RE, it is Christian ecumenical models of diversity which are dominant. And, indeed, the logic of ecumenical models is seen throughout the report. The problem is that these models are not as progressive as one might assume. For instance, Eaghll argues that:
the approach to religious education espoused by educators and politicians influenced by Smart and his forerunners is cliched because it presents itself as theologically and politically neutral, even though it is a clear remnant of old European Christian ecumenicism. (114)
Eaghll goes on to argue that thinkers who support a liberal, ecumenical understanding of religion, which seems to include the report’s authors, fail to critique western constructions of religion, but, instead ‘universalise[…] them as human features shared by all rational beings, [therefore] spreading a cultural ethnocentrism that privilege[s] a European view of the world…’ (118).
However, while the report does seem to be promoting the study of worldviews from a largely descriptive standpoint, it also champions more critical practice which goes beyond the mere pointing out of complexity. For instance, one of the reasons the report gives to keep the term ‘religion’ in the subject title is that it provides an opportunity ‘to signify that young people need to understand the concepts of “religion” as well as other concepts such as “secularity”, “secularism” and “spirituality”’ (5). But what is meant by ‘understand’. One would hope that what is meant is the learning of the cultural, political, and ideological origins of such categories and that the use of them are not acts of neutral classification. Though, if this is what was meant, why have the authors peppered the report with claims that certain worldviews are religious and others non-religious as if these were statements of fact (see above)? Indeed, this confused commitment to the critical analysis of key terms in RE’s lexicon is only made worse when the report states that a further role of Religion and Worldviews would be to ‘engage with important aspects of human experience including the religious, spiritual, cultural and moral’ (3); the report could not have stated a more essentialist and uncritical goal.
Thus, what is Religion and Worldviews? Does it represent a commitment to the critical analysis of the concepts of ‘religion’ and the political uses to which such terms are put; or does Religion and Worldviews represent a descriptive exercise which reifies key concepts in the name of promoting experiential respect of different realities? Despite the claims to the contrary by critical realists, one cannot be both a realist and a constructivist without falling into numerous contradictions. RE will, then, only have a clear identity once RE leaders make the case, once and for all, clearly and loudly, that RE is either a realist endeavour – largely what it is now – or a critical, constructivist endeavour. The desire to find a soggy compromise between the two has not and will not work.
In conclusion, the problem with the report can be summarised thus: while it was right that the authors emphasise the influence of worldviews and the social construction of realities, they ultimately fail to apply, consistently, a constructivist lens, and fail to use such lens to study their own worldviews. Consequently, a lot of the deeper ontological and epistemological issues which underpin many flawed, uncritical methods and theories in the Study of Religion and RE have not been challenged sufficiently; indeed, a lot of them have been adopted wholesale. This leads to the dominant, overall impression the report gives, that while it certainly, and no one can deny this, moves the debate on reforming RE forward, it largely represents an exercise of tinkering around the edges. The report feels, in other words, like it has kicked the can of radical reform down the road.
Jack Lewis Graham
Comments
Post a Comment