Empty Voices

Ever since Talal Asad penned his critique of Clifford Geertz’s (1993) definition of religion, a consensus has developed that both scholars are operating within different ontological frameworks. Jon P. Mitchell (2017), in his chapter ‘Defining Religion: Geertz and Asad’, supports such a consensus. Mitchell contends that Geertz offers a universal and essentialist definition of religion, whereas Asad offers a contextualist and discursive theory of religion. However, these differences fall apart under analysis. While it is true that Geertz and Asad disagree on many points, such disagreements are primarily based on different emphasises and agendas, not different ontological paradigms.   In ‘Religion as a Cultural System’, Geertz defines religion as (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men [sic] by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions of a general order

Within the study of religion in recent years, there has been a growing interest in what is meant by ‘theory’. The rise of this interest can partially be attributed to the critical turn, starting in earnest in the 1990s. The critical study of religion is largely concerned with the role of definition and classification and how ‘religion’, ‘world religions’, etc. are not neutral objects which exist in the world ‘out there’, but instead are social constructions operating according to the agendas of the definer or classifier. The role of the critical scholar, therefore, is to deploy theory in order to get behind descriptive presentations of religion and world religions – to get to the ideology which underlies them. It is undoubtably the case that in the past, too little attention was paid to the role of ideology in the construction, deconstruction and reconstruction processes which characterise the creation of classificatory systems and the societies they support. By focusing on theory in t